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Abstract
This paper offers a new identification strategy for disentangling structural state
dependence from unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. Our strategy exploits
market environments where there is a choice-consumption mismatch. We first
demonstrate the effectiveness of our identification strategy in obtaining unbiased
state dependence estimates via Monte Carlo analysis and highlight its superiority
relative to the extant choice-set variation based approach. In an empirical
application that uses data of repeat transactions from the car rental industry, we
find evidence of structural state dependence, but show that state dependence effects
may be overstated without exploiting the choice-consumption mismatches that
materialize through free upgrades.
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Introduction

Consumer choice shows remarkable stickiness across time. The stickiness may be due to
persistent unobserved heterogeneity---preferences that differ across consumers but
remain stable with consumers over time; or due to state dependence---a consumer’s
current choice drives the higher likelihood of the same choice in the future. 4
Disentangling state dependence from heterogeneity has been a major challenge in the
literature since Heckman (1981) highlighted the confounding nature of structural state
dependence and persistent unobserved heterogeneity. The key takeaway is that not
adequately accounting for heterogeneity can exaggerate the estimated level of state
dependence. This is not merely an econometric quibble; disentangling these two sources
of stickiness in choice across time is important in developing dynamically optimal
policies. For example, the optimality of policies pertaining to advertising (e.g., Dube,
Hitsch, and Manchanda, 2005; Freimer and Horsky, 2012; Mahajan and Muller, 1986),
consumer finance (e.g., Barone, Felici, and Pagnini, 2011; Israel, 2005a, 2005b), federal
procurement (e.g., Greenstein, 1993), health (e.g., Arcidiacono, Khwaja, and Ouyang,
2012; Handel, 2013; Iizuka, 2012; Janakiraman et. al., 2008; Naik and Moore, 1996),
housing (e.g., Moon and Stotsky, 1993), labor (e.g., Biewen, 2009; Coelli, Green, and
Warbuton, 2007; Heckman, 1981; Hyslop, 1999; Prowse, 2012), and pricing (e.g., Che,
Sudhir, and Seetharaman, 2007; Cosguner, Chan, and Seetharaman, 2012; Dube et. al.,
2008; Dube, Hitsch, and Rossi, 2009, 2010; Pavlidis and Ellickson, 2012) are crucially
dependent on whether structural state dependence or heterogeneity drives stickiness in
choice.
The literature has thus far relied on a combination of functional form assumptions

about the nature of heterogeneity and choice set variation across time to disentangle
unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence. Early on, researchers highlighted the
4

Some economic mechanisms behind structural state dependence may include consideration set formation,
switching costs, and/or learning.
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role of functional form assumptions on the structure of unobserved heterogeneity, that
permitted them to numerically integrate out the effect of unobserved heterogeneity on
choice behavior using simulation-based econometric methods (Arcidiacono, Khwaja, and
Ouyang, 2012; Erdem and Sun, 2001; Hyslop, 1999; Iizuka, 2012; Keane, 1997; Prowse,
2012; Seetharaman, 2004), and attribute the residual stickiness in choice behavior to
state dependence.5 Scholars continue to increase the level of flexibility they allow in the
functional forms (Dube, Hitsch, and Rossi, 2010; Honore and Kyriazidou, 2000; Moon
and Stotsky, 1993), to limit the possibility that a lack of adequate accommodation of
heterogeneity does not lead to exaggerated estimates of state dependence. In recent
years, researchers in industrial organization and marketing have highlighted the
importance of choice set variation over time as an essential ingredient of the
disentangling strategy, beyond the functional form assumptions on unobserved
heterogeneity. The choice set variation can occur in the form of changes in price (e.g.,
Dube, Hitsch, and Rossi, 2010), advertising (e.g., Terui, Ban, and Allenby, 2011),
availability of alternatives (e.g., Goldfarb, 2006b), or decision context (e.g., Thomadsen,
2012). Some scholars have augmented data to include some forms of observable
heterogeneity either in the form of household demographics (e.g., Goldfarb, 2006a;
Gupta, Chintagunta, and Wittink, 1997; Paulson, 2011, 2012) or through direct surveys
of preferences (e.g., Shin, Misra, and Horsky, 2012), but how much residual unobserved
heterogeneity remains beyond these observable controls remains an issue. Thus, despite
the large volume of literature on the topic, this identification challenge still remains an
open area of research, because existing methods are unable to fully disentangle
unobserved heterogeneity from state dependence.
In this paper, we introduce a new identification strategy to disentangle state dependence
and unobserved heterogeneity through only revealed preference data via exclusion
Furthermore, researchers have also uncovered variety seeking in choice as a form of “negative” state
dependence (Chintagunta, 1998, 1999; McAlister, 1982) in certain market settings.
5
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restrictions that arise in market environments where a consumer’s choice may not
match their consumption. Consider the following setting in the context of rental cars;
Customers make reservations for a car ahead of time; but when they arrive to pick up
the car, the reserved car might be out of stock, and therefore the customer may be
offered a free upgrade to a different car at no additional cost. Such upgrades due to
inventory shortages are common in many settings (Biyalogorsky et. al., 1999, 2005;
Wangenheim and Bayon, 2007), leading to a mismatch between choice and
consumption. As in the past literature, choice is affected by preferences and state
dependence, but the consumption based on upgrades only affects state dependence; thus
providing an exclusion restriction necessary to disentangle state dependence from
heterogeneity.
The choice-consumption mismatch can occur in other situations. For instance, free
samples may induce customers to consume products they had initially chosen not to try
(Bawa and Shoemaker, 2004; Cabral, 2012; Halbheer et. al., 2013; Pauwels and Weiss,
2008; Scott, 1976). Stock-outs in online retail would force customers to consume
alternatives if the item they originally clicked on is no longer available (Anupindi, Dada,
and Gupta, 1998; Bruno and Vilcassim, 2008; Conlon and Mortimer, 2010, 2013; Diels,
Wiebach, and Hildebrandt, 2013; Jing and Lewis, 2011; Musalem et. al., 2010). When
customers make purchases with e-commerce retailers, errors in shipped purchases
present lead to consumption of products, they were not originally ordered (Collier and
Bienstock, 2006a; Collier and Bienstock, 2006b; Gregg and Scott, 2008; Vaidyanathan
and Devaraj, 2008). Finally, product recalls force customers to cease the use of
originally purchased items in favor of alternatives offered by the firm (Freedman,
Kearney, and Lederman, 2012; Haunschild and Rhee, 2004; Marsh, Schroeder, and
Mintert, 2006; Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe, 2007). There are two common
characteristics across these examples. First, it is feasible in all of these examples to
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collect first data on choice before the consumption occurs (e.g., reservations for services,
items to be or already checked-out in shopping cart). Second, consumption is shifted in
ways that need not be correlated with unobserved preferences.
We begin by providing a heuristic proof of why choice-consumption mismatches help
disentangle state dependence and heterogeneity, and why it is superior to the traditional
strategy of using choice set variation in combination with rich functional forms to
accommodate unobserved heterogeneity. We then demonstrate its effectiveness through
a Monte Carlo analysis, where we simulate data consistent with a simple multinomial
choice model with both persistent unobserved heterogeneity and structural state
dependence, accommodating choice set variation and choice-consumption mismatches.
Estimates from our simulated datasets show that choice set variation does help reduce
the upward bias, but not as well as the choice-consumption mismatch data. Further
unlike choice-consumption mismatches, choice set variation does not completely debias
the state dependence parameter.
We then perform an empirical analysis using repeat transactions data from the car
rental service industry. Free upgrades driven by inventory shortages are a common
occurrence in the industry; therefore this data allows us to exploit mismatch between
choice and consumption. Our analysis of the upgrading propensity indicates that
upgrades are more likely to occur when the car class a customer has chosen is in short
supply---i.e., real time supply conditions at the point of consumption drive the
upgrading propensity for a customer independent of customer and rental trip
characteristics, providing us an exogenous source of variation in consumption that is
independent of customer preferences.
Our estimates of a model of customer car class choice exploiting the choice-consumption
mismatch strategy to disentangle state dependence from heterogeneity confirms that
structural state dependence is indeed prevalent among consumers. Further, our
5

simulation analysis confirms that the state dependence estimates are exaggerated
without the choice-consumption mismatch data. The estimated level of state dependence
is higher when we ignore households that have received free upgrades.
We later use the model estimates to perform counterfactual simulations to study the
impact of implementing free upgrade policies. We find that due to our estimated level of
state dependence an upgrade to a higher margin better class has long-term positive
effects on revenue, in that consumers rent from the higher class in the future. To
highlight potential confounding effects of unobserved heterogeneity, we show that these
increases in revenue are estimated to be markedly larger than what is true when state
dependence is inferred based on the sub-sample of households that did not receive
upgrades and for whom therefore estimates of state dependence are exaggerated due to
the confound with heterogeneity.

2

Related Literature

Functional form assumptions and choice set variation are commonly exploited in
research about state dependence (Ackerberg, 2003; Erdem and Keane, 1996; Erdem and
Sun, 2001; Keane, 1997; Osborne, 2010; Seetharaman, 2004). However, there remain
concerns about the validity of such assumptions. For instance, Paulson (2011) argues
that simulation-based estimation procedures rely too heavily on correctly specifying the
structure of unobserved heterogeneity. Dube, Hitsch, and Rossi (2010) relax these
functional form assumptions and offer a semi-parametric approach to flexibly account
for

heterogeneity

in

order

to

disentangle

state

dependence

and

unobserved

heterogeneity. To aid in their identification, the authors exploit variation in price
discounts as a means to vary choice sets. In a similar manner as price discounts,
Goldfarb (2006b) exploits variation in choice sets11 of online portals due to exogenous

11

Although Bruno and Vilcassim (2008) do not study long-run effects, variation in retail stock-outs may
be applied in a similar manner as Goldfarb (2006b).

6

changes in availability following denial of service attacks, Handel (2013) uses a change
to insurance provision, Thomadsen (2012) uses variation in store choice, and Liu,
Derdenger, and Sun (2013) exploit differences in compatibility between various base
products and add-ons that affect the choice set for purchasing add-ons.
Paulson (2012) argues that price promotions alone may not induce enough variation in
choice sets to facilitate the disentangling of state dependence from heterogeneity. The
main issue is that past purchase decisions are always going to be functions of
unobserved heterogeneity; to truly disentangle state dependence the variation in choice
sets need to be sufficiently large to induce purchases that would not have been made
otherwise. Her suggestion is to supplement choice set variation in prices with
demographic and/or survey data. For instance, Shin, Misra, and Horsky (2012), and
Pavlidis and Ellickson (2012) use supplementary survey response data, while Goldfarb
(2006a) and Gupta, Chintagunta, and Wittink (1997) incorporate household-specific
heterogeneity using demographic data. Regardless of how well this additional
information generates variation in choice sets, the core issue that Paulson (2012)
brought up remains, as past decisions are still affected by unobserved heterogeneity. It
is this core identification problem that our new exclusion restriction based approach
addresses by exploiting mismatches between choice and actual consumption.

3

Identification of State Dependence

3.1 Model and Identification Problem
In this section, we introduce and implement a Monte Carlo simulation exercise to
demonstrate the identification power of forced substitution via mismatches between
choice and consumption. These simulations are meant to illustrate that mismatches help
reduce the positive bias of inferred structural state dependence.

7

For these simulations, we consider a simple discrete choice model in which customer i
chooses to purchase among j

{1,2,..., J } products or services. A customer who chooses

product j during transaction t is denoted as dit

j . Choosing the baseline option of 1

yields zero utility for the customer. To be consistent with our empirical application, we
consider the case here where products are vertically differentiated, and increase in
quality such that
dit

j

j 1

.12 Therefore, a customer receives the following utility from

j:

U ijt

j

pijt

sijt

A customer chooses j if and only if U ijt

i

it

U ikt for all k

heterogeneity is included in this model via

i

~ N (0,

2

),

it

j . Persistent unobserved

is an i.i.d. Type I Extreme

Value random variable, and prices are given by pijt . Structural state dependence is
captured by the parameter

, where sijt

1{cit

1

j } is a dummy variable indicating

whether or not the customer consumed the same product in the previous transaction.
Our primary objective is to obtain as accurate of an estimate for structural state
dependence as possible, in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. It is well known
that persistence in behaviors can be caused by unobserved heterogeneity, as past
consumption is usually correlated with

i

. In the typical case, dit

cit , then is clear

that past brand choice decisions (and therefore consumption) are correlated with
unobserved preferences that persist over time as. Therefore, estimates of
confounded by
varying dit
12

1

i

will be

. To avoid such confounds, one would then need some method of

in ways that are independent of unobserved preferences.

Note that the identification arguments we make do not depend on vertical differentiation.

8

3.2 Identification Based on Choice-Consumption Mismatch
As explained earlier, the choice-consumption mismatch varies dit

1

independent of

unobserved preferences to help disentangle state dependence from heterogeneity.
Figure 1 Diagram Illustrating Mismatch Between Choice and Consumption

Figure 1 provides a decision diagram that describes potential mismatches between
choice and consumption ( dit

cit ). Here, a customer who has originally chosen option j

may potentially be forced to consume a different product j * . We denote such an event
as mit

1 . This mismatch event occurs with a probability of

that is independent of

customer characteristics (e.g., supply driven factors such as inventory shortages).
The assumptions that we need for this identification strategy to be valid are as follows:
cit 1,

it

i

cit

i

1

| mit

| mit

1

1

We now illustrate the conditions for which choice-consumption mismatches serve as an
effective exclusion restriction using a simple heuristic proof. When mismatches are often
9

induced by factors exogenous to the customer (as in the examples described in the
introduction), the assumption that

i

mit

1

holds.

Based on the model we have described, we can write lagged consumption in light of
choice-consumption mismatches as follows:

cit

(1

1

mit 1 )dit 1( , , , i )

mit 1 j *

It then becomes clear that as the probability of a mismatch increases, the degree to
which

i

confounds the expected consumption measure approaches zero. Consequently,

the requirement that

cit

i

1

| mit

1

is likely to be satisfied with large values of

.

Researchers have in the past disentangled structural state dependence from unobserved
heterogeneity using choice set variation. Using a similar model as before, we now
explore the identification power of such variation in the. The difference now is that
instead of a potential mismatch between choice and consumption, there is a probability,
which we denote as

, that a customer’s choice set changes. For our exposition, we

frame these choice set changes around price discounts. In the event that a customer
faces a change in the choice set, the new price for j is pijt*

pijt , where

(0,1) is the

fraction of the original price that the customer would have had to pay. With this new
choice set, the customer then makes decision dit* , instead of dit . When the customer does
not encounter a choice set change, the price remains at pijt . Based on the model we
have described, we can write lagged consumption in light of price discounts as follows:

cit

1

(1

mit 1 )dit 1( , , , i )

10

mit 1dit* 1( , , , i , )

Notice that even when the probability of a change in consumption set is large via
frequent price discounting, lagged consumption remains a function of unobserved
preferences. Hence while choice set variation can reduce the bias, it can almost never
truly debias the state dependence estimate.

3.3 Monte Carlo Analysis
We now illustrate using a simulation the bias reduction benefits of the choiceconsumption mismatch strategy for identifying state dependence.
For our first set of simulations, we consider a scenario with 1,000 customers who make 5
repeat purchases each, and are potentially faced with choice-consumption mismatches.
Each customer can choose between three products, j

{1,2, 3} , where product 1 is the

baseline option that yields zero utility. In terms of the other parameterizations, we set
the intercepts as

2

0.1 and

3

0.8 respectively. Here, product 3 is of a higher
0.3 . State dependence effects are

quality than product 2. Price sensitivity is set at
set at

0.6 . For the variance of unobserved heterogeneity, we set

different values for the mismatch probability, namely

5 . We try

{0.25, 0.5, 0.75} . For the prices

of products 2 and 3, we draw them from a truncated Normal distribution with means
0.2 and 0.9 respectively.
With each parameterization, we forward simulate the sequence of choices ( dit ) and
actual consumption ( cit ) for each customer, which serve as the simulated datasets for
our subsequent estimations. To implement the choice-consumption mismatches, we try
to mimic an environment in which customers are given free upgrades. Therefore, with
probability

, customers who had originally chosen the lower two options, 1 and 2, may

be upgraded for free to option 3 instead (i.e., j *

11

3 ).

For our next set of simulations, we consider again a scenario with 1,000 customers who
make 5 transactions each and face the possibility of facing a new choice set with
probability

. We set the same parameters as before. In these simulations, we now have

the additional parameter, which is the price discount set at 1

0.25 . This price

discount is applied to product 3.
Table 1 Estimates for Structural State Dependence Using Simulated Data

25%
50%
75%

Choice-consumption mismatch
Estimate SE
95% CI
% bias
1.249
0.007 1.235 1.262
108%
0.819
0.006 0.807 0.831
37%
0.606
0.007 0.593 0.619
1%

Estimate
1.559
1.363
1.322

Choice set variation
SE
95% CI
0.012 1.537 1.582
0.013 1.338 1.388
0.015 1.293 1.352

% bias
160%
127%
120%

We can then estimate the model parameters using each of the simulated datasets. To
estimate this discrete choice model, we use simulated maximum likelihood. Table 1
provides us the estimates of structural state dependence from each of the simulated
datasets. The first three columns provide us the results from simulations that exploit
the choice-consumption mismatches, while the latter three columns provide us the
results from simulations that exploit choice set variation. Recall that the data was
generated with the state dependence parameter

0.6 , we wish to determine how

effective the choice-consumption mismatch and choice set variation are at eliminating
the bias.
We first look at the bias reduction from increasing the mismatch probability, as
suggested earlier in our discussion about identification. Confirming the intuition behind
our assertion, we see that the estimates approach the true value as

increases. Most

importantly, the bias is virtually eliminated when customers face a high probability of
choice-consumption mismatch. Furthermore, the true value of state dependence lies
within the 95% confidence interval for the estimates. In our simulations with variation
in choice sets, the bias reduction associated with changes in the choice set is markedly
12

less than in our simulations with the choice-consumption mismatch; the confidence
interval does not include the true parameter value even with high probability of choice
set variation.
To summarize, this Monte Carlo analysis demonstrates the benefit of exploiting the
choice-consumption mismatch in disentangling state dependence and heterogeneity, the
greater the frequency with which such mismatches occur, the greater the potential to
reduce the bias in estimates of state dependence due to the confound with unobserved
heterogeneity. In fact, unlike choice set variation that does not completely eliminate
bias, the mismatch approach has the potential to completely debias the state
dependence estimate.

4

Empirical Application: Car Rental Industry

4.1 Data Description
Our setting is the car rental industry, in which we utilize a sample of data from an
international car rental company on repeat transactions of customers from 2011 to 2012.
Repeat customers are identified in the data via their loyalty program membership.
As shown in Table 2, about 20% of the users rented 2 times, while about 6% and 2%
rented 3 and 4 times respectively. The remaining 3% of users rented 5 or more times. As
our empirical analysis of state dependence will be based on the car class choice among
travelers, we focus on the subset of customers that have booked with the car rental
company at least twice over the course of 2 years. This leaves us with nearly 100,000
transactions. As is standard in the choice literature, we assume here that customers who
rent only once and customers who rent multiple times are not different in terms of their
unobserved preferences towards car class alternatives.
For each transaction, we can identify which car class was booked, driven, and paid for.
Classes are vertically differentiated, so the higher the class, the higher the quality of the
13

car rental.14 In the event that a user drives a higher class than was originally booked,
and pays for the higher class, we would classify that transaction as being an upsell.
About 2% of the sample contains such upsell transactions. In the event that a user
drives a higher class than was originally booked, but pays the same amount as for the
class that was originally booked, we would classify that transaction as being an upgrade.
Upgrades occur in about 51% of the sample. This high upgrade probability suggests that
the empirical application using car rental data will benefit from our new identification
strategy that exploits the choice-consumption mismatch. Based on the previously
reported simulation, we know the choice-consumption mismatch data is more effective
in debiasing state dependence estimate when the proportion of mismatches is high.
Table 2 Distribution of the Number of Transactions Across Users

Transactions
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Frequency
219,491
58,186
19,554
6,988
2,790
1,440
931
752
504
560
418
324
286
294
195
224
187
162
95
240
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Percent
69.53
18.43
6.19
2.21
0.88
0.46
0.29
0.24
0.16
0.18
0.13
0.1
0.09
0.09
0.06
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.03
0.08

Cumulative
69.53
87.96
94.15
96.36
97.25
97.7
98
98.24
98.4
98.57
98.71
98.81
98.9
98.99
99.05
99.12
99.18
99.24
99.27
99.34

This assertion is based on insights obtained during a conference call with the car rental company’s
executives facilitated by Wharton’s Customer Analytics Initiative on October 4, 2013. Due to a
confidentiality agreement with the car rental company, we are unable to disclose exactly which exact
models belong to each car class. Note that in the data there is actually a 26 th class. This class is assigned
to car models that belong to a range of different classes. Given the potential inaccuracies of this particular
class label, we exclude all transactions involving class 26.
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Figure 2 Distribution of Car Class Choices

Percent (%)
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20
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0
1

2

3

4

5

6
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7
8
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11

12

16

17

18

Paid

Figure 2 displays the distribution of car class choices across transactions. 16 From this
histogram we see that users are primarily booking and paying for lower class cars (i.e.,
below 6). However, in classes 1-4, which constitutes a significant fraction of the overall
transactions, a large fraction of customers do not end up driving the same car they
reserved. It appears that classes 6, 12 and 17 are the most commonly used cars for
providing free upgrades (i.e., they constitute about 32, 15 and 18 percent of the cars
that users drive upon receiving upgrades). Class 3 has a higher proportion of people
paying for it than that reserved, suggesting this class is used by the firm for upsell to
those who book in classes 1 and 2 (i.e., about 45 percent of customers who originally
booked classes 1 and 2 are upsold to class 3).
Table 3 Summary Statistics for Trip Characteristics

Variable
Airport
Phone reserve
Business
Weekend
Duration
# transactions
Price
Age
Tier
Observations

Full sample
Mean
Std. Dev.
0.429
0.495
0.114
0.318
0.382
0.486
0.473
0.499
4.229
6.467
2.386
3.804
205.040 240.574
52.308
11.828
1.970
1.132
96209

Upgrade
Mean
Std. Dev.
0.422
0.494
0.117
0.321
0.405
0.491
0.465
0.499
4.254
6.855
2.739
4.693
188.786 223.656
51.923
11.812
2.138
1.214
49174

16

No upgrade
Mean
Std. Dev.
0.437
0.496
0.111
0.314
0.357
0.479
0.482
0.500
4.203
6.034
2.016
2.512
222.033 255.975
52.710
11.831
1.795
1.011
47035

For visual clarity, note that the figure does not display the percentage of transactions that involve car
classes 10, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 as they each constitute less than 1%.
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Other trip characteristics that we incorporate in our analysis include whether the car is
rented from an airport location, is booked over the phone, is for business purposes,
and/or is a weekend rental. We see also know the duration of each rental. From Table
3, about 40% of the transactions occur via airport rental locations, 11% are booked via
phone, 38% are for business purposes, and 47% occur on the weekend. The typical car
rental length is about 4 days. A user spends on average about $205 per transaction. The
average tier of a customer is about 2, where 1 is the lowest tier and 7 is the highest.17
We now provide a comparison of summary statistics across users based on whether or
not they received upgrades. This comparison serves to demonstrate that the observable
user-trip characteristics are similar across the two sub-samples. In general, the mean
and standard deviation looks quite similar across the sub-samples. The only noticeable
difference is in prices, in which upgraded customers appear to be paying $30 less than
customers who did not receive free upgrades.

4.2 Empirical Patterns of Upgrades
Upgrades generate choice-consumption mismatches by forcing users to experience classes
that are different (and higher) than the classes originally booked, but without any
additional cost. For our identification approach, we rely on the assumption that these
mismatches are exogenous to consumer preferences. Based on the market environment,
we suggested that these upgrades are driven by supply considerations such as inventory.
It is also possible that upgrades are linked to elite status and other consumer/trip
characteristics. To the extent we are able to control for such observable consumer/trip
characteristics in the upgrading propensity, the supply side instruments related to
inventory would serve to provide the necessary exclusion restrictions for the choiceconsumption mismatch strategy to work.
Higher tiers are considered to be more “elite.” Based on information provided by Wharton’s Customer
Analytics Initiative, tier level membership is based on the number of rental transactions, number of rental
days, a monthly or annual fee, or some combination of all three. However, it was not disclosed by the car
rental company as to the exact membership requirements and benefits for each level.
17

16

Table 4 Summary Statistics for Inventory Conditions

Percentile
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev

1%

25%

50%

75%

99%

Min

Max

# check-out

1.128

0.453

1

1

1

1

3

1

9

Net supply

0.003

0.463

-1

0

0

0

1

-8

5

We focus on three variables that may be used to proxy for stock-outs. As the data itself
does not contain inventory information, we have to infer general demand-supply
conditions using the available information.18 Table 4 provides summary statistics for the
supply-side proxies we use.
The first variable we consider is the total number of check-outs for the current reserved
transaction class at a particular location within the hour of rental. This measure gives
us an idea about the demand for specific car classes at each rental location. With this
measure, one hypothesis we first test is whether upgrade propensity increases with the
demand for cars. The intuition is that if demand is high for the car class that is booked,
then the chance that this booked class is no longer available is high, and thus, a greater
likelihood of receiving a free upgrade. Figure 3 confirms that there is indeed a
disproportionately larger amount of transactions with upgrades as the demand is high
(i.e., 2 or more check-outs versus only 1 check-out).

Difference

Figure 3 Percentage Difference Between the Number of Transactions With and Without Upgrades

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1

2

3
4
# check-out

18

5

6

The car rental company was unable to provide us data on (real-time) inventories when we requested
such information.
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The second variable we consider is the total number of check-ins net of the total
number of check-outs at a particular location at the time of a transaction. As the
number of check-ins help proxy for the number of cars returned, and the number of
check-outs proxy for the number of cars demanded, the net difference of these variables
may be interpreted as the net supply (or flow) of available cars. Our second hypothesis
is to test whether or not upgrade propensity decreases with this measure. If the net
supply is high, then the stock-out probability is low, thereby reducing the likelihood of
free upgrades. Figure 4 confirms our intuition, since the percentage difference between
the number of transactions with and without upgrades diminishes as net supply
increases (i.e., negative net supply versus positive net supply).

Difference

Figure 4 Percentage Difference Between the Number of Transactions With and Without Upgrades
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Using these supply-side measures, we estimate two different probit specifications with
user-level random effects. Table 5 presents the main upgrade patterns in our data. The
first column highlights our analysis using the proxy for demand. First note that
upgrades are correlated with trip/user characteristics. For instance, a user is less likely
to receive an upgrade at an airport, or on a weekend. Older customers, as well as those
paying a higher price are also less likely to receive a free upgrade. In contrast, business
users, high volume users, and those that belong to a higher tier are more likely to
receive a free upgrade.
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Table 5 Probit Specification for Upgrade Propensity

# check-out
Net supply
Airport
Phone reserve
Business
Weekend
Duration
# transactions
Price
Age
Tier
Constant
Random effects
Observations

Upgrade
Estimate
SE
0.0510***
(0.00941)
-0.0810***
(0.00954)
-0.0249
(0.0142)
0.176***
(0.00909)
-0.0140
(0.00877)
0.0423***
(0.00174)
0.0215***
(0.00181)
-0.00154*** (0.0000605)
-0.00231*** (0.000374)
0.109***
(0.00408)
-0.211
(0.160)
Yes
96209

Estimate

Upgrade
SE

-0.0221*
(0.00861)
-0.0729***
(0.00940)
-0.0259
(0.0142)
0.179***
(0.00906)
-0.0151
(0.00876)
0.0422***
(0.00174)
0.0219***
(0.00180)
-0.00153*** (0.0000603)
-0.00236*** (0.000374)
0.109***
(0.00408)
-0.144
(0.161)
Yes
96209

Most importantly, we see that upgrade propensity increases with demand. Analogously,
the second column confirms a negative relationship between upgrade propensity and net
supply. Even after targeting strategies based on user/trip type are controlled for, we
provide empirical evidence that highlights a relationship between supply-side conditions
and free upgrades.19 These results motivate further the idea that choice-consumption
mismatches (through upgrades) are likely to be driven by “exogenous” factors.

4.3 Model
This section presents the random utility logit model with endogeneity and structural
state dependence that we use in our empirical application. The model contains two
stages. First, customers choose the car class they wish to rent in the reservation stage.
After making the reservation, customers reach the point of consumption stage, at which
point the car class they end up driving may or may not be the same as the class
originally chosen.

19

Note that we also tried specifications with upsells as the dependent variable. In these specifications, we
find no empirical relationship between upselling propensity and supply-side conditions. The main drivers
behind observed upsells are the user-trip characteristics.
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4.3.1 Reservation Stage
In the reservation stage, each customer i decides on which car class to rent at the
beginning of each transaction t ; we denote the decision to choose car class j as

dit

j

{1,2,...,J} . Customers decide on classes that yield the highest utility, where

utility is defined as:

U ijt

j

Xit

sijt

ij

ijt

Customers make their decisions based on trip characteristics, represented by the vector

X it . Furthermore, as higher car classes are of higher quality, we include a car class
intercept

j

, which we assume gets larger as j increases. There may be unobserved and

persistent factors as to why some car classes are inherently preferred by some customers,
which we model using random effects

ij

N (0,

2

) . The error term

ijt

follows an i.i.d.

Type I Extreme Value distribution.
State dependence is captured by the state variable sijt

1{cit

1

j } , which is an

indicator for whether in the previous transaction, the user actually drove class j in the
previous transaction.
4.3.2 Point of Consumption Stage
Each transaction is completed at the point of consumption, which is when customers
pick up the car keys at the sales desk. Upon the customer’s arrival to the point of
consumption, the customer may end up driving a different class than the one originally
booked in the reservation stage for two reasons. First, the customer may receive a free
car class upgrade to class

jUG  j , which we indicate with mUG
it
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1 . Second, the

customer may accept an upsold class

jUS  j , which we indicate with mUS
it

1.

Therefore, the customer’s past consumption can be expressed in a similar manner as our
earlier Monte Carlo analysis:
cit 1  (1  mitUG1 )(1  mitUS1 )dit 1  mitUG1 jUG  mitUS1 jUS

Based on this specification, it is clear that cit 1  dit 1 is possible. This specification
suggests potential endogeneity in the past consumption cit 1 . Elements that are
endogenous include mitUG1 and mitUS1 . To address this endogeneity issue, we employ a
limited information maximum likelihood approach along the lines of Villas-Boas and
Winer (1999).
The first source of endogeneity comes from upgrades, as the description of our data
reveals that they may be targeted. One assumption we make here is that once customers
receive a free class upgrade option, we assume that they accept doing so allows them to
drive a higher quality car without paying a higher price. Therefore, we focus on
modeling the firm’s decision about whether or not to provide the free upgrade. Here, the
latent payoff to the firm for providing an upgrade is defined as:

it

Zit

it

In addition to the user-trip characteristics that enter into a customer’s utility, the latent
payoff from initiating an upgrade incorporates the total number of check-outs and net
supply. Both user characteristics and supply-side conditions are then included in the
vector Z it . The error term here is denoted by

it

, which we assume to follow an i.i.d.

Type I Extreme Value distribution. We denote the distribution for

mUG
it

1 as f ( it ) .
21

it

that rationalizes

The second source of endogeneity comes from upsells. Based on the institutional details
from our empirical setting, we assume that some customers are presented with
opportunities to be upsold. Sales representatives may induce customers to switch and
Xit . As certain

pay for a higher class via some price discount, which we represent as

types of customers appear more likely to receive and accept upsells, we allow the price
discount benefit to be a function of observable user-trip characteristics. We now discuss
how the distribution that rationalizes mUS
it

1 can be recovered. Note that at the

reservation stage, class j was chosen over class jUS as U ijt

U ijUS t ; but at the point of

consumption, the sales agent’s marketing efforts may lead to U ijUSUS t

U ijUSUS t

Xit

Xit

jUS

sijUS t

ijUS

U ijt where:

ijUS t

Notice here that the main difference between U ijUSUS t and U ijUS t is the term

mUS
it

1 would hold provided that the condition U ijUSUS t

U ijUSUS t

U ijt

Xit

(

jUS

j

)

(sijUS t

1

sijt 1 )

Xit . Thus,

U ijt is satisfied:
(

ijUS

ij

)

(

ijUS t

ijt

)

0

4.3.3 Econometric Specification
With the consumer choice model, along with the data generating processes for
upgrading and upselling decisions, we can now specify the likelihood for structural
estimation. The likelihood function is therefore written as:

L({ j } j , , , , , )
T

J

t 1 j 1 jUS

f ( it ) {f (
j

ijt

,

ijUS t

|

ij

,
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ijUS

)g(dit |

it

,

ijt

,

ijUS t

,

ij

)}d

ij

d

ijUS

The term f (

ijt

,

ijUS t

|

ij

,

ijUS

) is the joint probability density function implied by the

upsell acceptance decisions by customers. This joint probability density function is
conditional on unobserved heterogeneity as a customer ultimately decides whether or
not to accept the upsell. Finally, the car class choice decision is captured by
g(dit |

it

,

ijt

,

ijUS t

,

ij

) , which can be written as:

g(dit |

it

,

ijt

,

exp(
exp(

i

ijUS t

,

ij

)

Xit

j
k

Xit

sijt
sikt

ij

ijt
ik

)
ikt

)

k

To estimate the likelihood, we turn to simulated maximum likelihood (SML), which
allows us to integrate out the unobserved heterogeneity terms.

4.4 Main Estimates
Given the model above, we consider two different specifications. To highlight the
importance of variation in past upgrades, we compare the state dependence estimates
across two samples: (1) the entire sample of transactions and (2) sub-sample of
observations that exclude customers who received two or more free upgrades previously.
Table 6 Key Estimates from the Structural Model

State dependence (

)

Unobserved heterogeneity (
Controls
Random effects
Observations

)

Full sample
Estimate SE
0.620*** (0.144)
0.932*** (0.120)
Yes
Yes
96209
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Sub-sample
Estimate SE
2.249*** (1.021)
0.935*** (0.225)
Yes
Yes
47035

Table 6 highlights the estimated state dependence and heterogeneity parameters.20 In
both cases, unobserved heterogeneity is present and the estimated variance for
unobserved heterogeneity is similar. However, the structural state dependence effects are
exaggerated when we exclude customers who received two or more free upgrades. These
empirical results are consistent with our earlier Monte Carlo analysis, as inferred state
dependence decreases (towards the true value) with the frequency of choice-consumption
mismatches.

4.5 Economic Value of a Free Upgrade Policy
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of free upgrades as a promotional tool. The
presence of state dependence implies that policies such as free upgrades or samples may
have carry-over effects over time. Furthermore, we investigate the extent to which our
evaluation of free upgrade policies is affected by biases in inferred state dependence.
For this analysis, we pick the most frequently booked class 3, and offer free upgrades to
all customers who pick that class. Upgraded customers then have the opportunity to
drive a class that is one level up, so the upgraded class would be 4. Given this
promotion policy, we simulate the customer car class choice behavior in subsequent
purchases. Combined with average prices for each car class, the simulated decisions
under the various scenarios are then used to construct simulated revenues across classes.
With the counterfactual upgrade policy, we then compare the revenues without the free
upgrades, to the revenues with free upgrades. Intuitively, one would expect the
introduction of free upgrades would increase the revenue for class 4, while at the same
time, decrease the revenue for class 3.
We then repeat this analysis using fitted model based on the sub-sample of observations
which exclude customers who received upgrades in the past. Note that for comparability
20

We refer the reader to the Appendix for a full set of estimates.
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between the simulations based on full sample and sub-sample estimates, we use the
same number of customers when performing these simulations. Table 7 highlights the
main findings from these counterfactual simulations. The first two columns compare the
revenue across scenarios without and with free upgrades using the fitted model, while
the latter two columns compare the revenue across scenarios without and with free
upgrades using the fitted based on the sub-sample that excludes customers that received
two or more upgrades in the past. Although we do not have data on cost, policies that
shift customers towards the higher classes are presumed to be profitable, as margins are
most likely larger for the higher classes. Therefore, a free upgrade campaign may be
profitable via its ability to induce inertial choices towards more profitable car classes.
Table 7 Economic Value of Providing Free Upgrades

Class
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
11
12
13
14
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Total

Full sample
No upgrade Upgrade
$17,202
$17,871
$75,556
$78,344
$243,450
$220,760
$46,213
$56,387
$1,117
$1,158
$223,830
$230,850
$9,176
$9,521
$849
$874
$5,743
$5,967
$1,405
$1,460
$39,665
$41,078
$825
$851
$585
$613
$1,516
$1,569
$27,586
$28,537
$18,844
$19,517
$1,617
$1,672
$12,462
$12,931
$2,572
$2,666
$807
$843
$635
$657
$730
$757
$732,384
$734,884
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Sub-sample
No upgrade Upgrade
$17,477
$19,123
$68,544
$73,646
$240,300
$178,240
$41,935
$83,896
$698
$744
$253,940
$266,280
$6,744
$7,217
$643
$694
$3,306
$3,555
$1,201
$1,295
$32,770
$34,624
$41
$42
$15
$16
$1,193
$1,286
$28,565
$30,002
$18,470
$19,790
$1,403
$1,498
$10,371
$11,115
$1,292
$1,391
$642
$697
$179
$191
$870
$942
$730,599
$736,283

As expected, revenue increases for classes 4 after the free upgrade policy, while revenues
decrease for classes 3. Furthermore, Figure 5 shows that the free upgrade policy may
have positive effects that carry into non-promoted classes. The reason we see such
patterns is that by upgrading customers who originally picked 3 to car class 4, the
policy effectively lowers the latent utility for 3 via the state dependence effect. Although
most customers will be drawn to the upgraded class 4 in subsequent transactions due to
state dependence, there remains a subset of them who will choose alternative classes in
light of the lowered utility from consuming 3. For instance, one subset may consist of
customers who originally picked class 3, but switch into classes 1 and 2 after being
upgraded class 4. Alternatively, another subset may include those who switch into car
classes even higher than 4, such as 6. The car rental company would benefit more from
the latter subset of customers, as opposed to the former group. Notice however that the
extent to which the free upgrade policy spills into other classes approaches zero as these
classes move further away from 3.
Figure 5 Change in Revenues Across Classes After Free Upgrade Policy

Difference in revenue ($)

60000
40000
20000
0
-20000 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

-40000
-60000
-80000

Car class
Full sample

Sub-sample

When we compare these results with those generated using the fitted model based on
the sub-sample, we see that the economic benefit of free upgrades is larger in terms of
revenue share gains for the higher end class 4. The increase in revenue for the upgraded
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class is noticeably larger than that obtained from our analysis using the full sample.
This finding leads us to believe that the exclusion of choice-consumption mismatch data
may result in overly optimistic assessments about the tangible benefits of free upgrade
campaigns. Ultimately, these overoptimistic forecasts would lead us to pursue more
promotional campaigns (that are costly) than truly warranted.

5

Conclusion

We introduce a new empirical strategy for identifying structural state dependence that
exploits mismatches between choice and consumption. These mismatches help us
(partially) break the correlation between past consumption and unobserved preferences,
and will ultimately facilitate more optimal dynamic marketing strategies. In our Monte
Carlo analysis, we demonstrate that in simulated datasets where free upgrades are
frequently offered to customers, the bias in inferred state dependence can be reduced
almost entirely. In contrast, existing approaches using choice set variation via price
discounts is not very effective in eliminating the bias.
To apply our identification method, we estimate state dependence using data on repeat
transactions from the car rental service industry. Free upgrades happen very frequently
in the data, and are correlated with supply-side conditions pertaining to inventory. Such
institutional features provide us an ideal environment to study and exploit mismatches
between choice and consumption.
Two main results emerge from this empirical analysis. First, we confirm the presence of
state dependence in a simple multinomial choice model that allows for unobserved
customer-level random effects. Second, we show that inferred state dependence may be
overstated if variation in past free upgrades is ignored. The second result allows us to
conclude that unobserved heterogeneity is a relevant issue, and that free upgrades can
serve to reduce the positive bias in inferred state dependence; thereby confirming our
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results from Monte Carlo analysis that state dependence is exaggerated in the absence
of exclusion restrictions obtained through mismatches between choice and consumption.
Counterfactual analysis using the estimated model illustrate that the estimated level of
state dependence has significant marginal effects on subsequent purchasing decisions.
Furthermore, the same analysis using a sub-sample of observations that exclude users
who received upgrades yields overstated effects, confirming the managerial importance
of correctly disentangling state dependence and heterogeneity. Finally, we show that
free upgrade campaigns can have long-run benefits; such campaigns shift purchases
towards upgraded higher-end cars higher margins over the long term. But when choiceconsumption mismatches are omitted in estimation of state dependence, the projections
of increase in revenue shares of promoted higher-end classes are overstated.
From a practical standpoint, our new method for disentangling state dependence and
unobserved heterogeneity can be applied to a variety of settings for which researchers
can record as data, stated choices and actual consumption. For example, if we are using
data from the service industry, we would need to know which option is reserved, and
which option is actually experienced at the point of consumption. If instead we are
using data from online retail, we would record which items are purchased, in addition to
which items are actually delivered. Furthermore, our identification approach opens the
door to experimentation strategies for managers as a means to more accurately estimate
demand systems with state dependence by randomly selecting customers for free service
upgrades or product switches upon shipment. Ultimately, the more accurate inferences
about state dependence will not only improve dynamic advertising, marketing mix,
pricing, promotion, and targeting strategies, but also provide more accurate predictions
of the rate of returns from such strategies.
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A

Additional Details about Estimates
Table 8 Complete Set of Model Estimates from the Empirical Application

State dependence
Variance for unobserved heterogeneity

Full sample
Estimate SE
0.620
0.144
0.932
0.120

Sub-sample
Estimate SE
2.249
1.021
0.935
0.225

0.631
0.118
0.041
0.924
0.200
-0.003
-0.012
0.178
0.620

0.018
0.007
0.121
0.184
2.042
8.857
0.417
0.380
0.144

0.500
0.231
0.146
0.722
-0.034
0.000
-0.051
-0.111
2.249

3.480
1.656
3.732
4.565
2.179
1.168
0.110
2.604
1.021

-0.932
-0.031
0.917
-0.316
0.703
0.341
0.837
-0.820
0.884
0.954
-5.695

0.120
0.003
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.010
0.825
0.269
0.003
0.504
1.348

-0.935
-0.037
0.900
-0.254
0.631
0.040
-0.875
-0.255
0.603
1.406
-5.933

0.225
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.003
0.000
0.028
0.001
0.139
0.093

0.006
-0.450
-0.190
-0.027
0.001
0.014
0.000
-0.005
0.023

0.020
0.042
0.021
0.019
0.002
0.002
0.000
0.001
0.009

0.007
-0.458
-0.211
-0.040
-0.001
0.041
0.000
-0.006
0.057

0.036
0.076
0.039
0.034
0.003
0.003
0.000
0.001
0.016

Customer car class decision
Airport
Phone reserve
Business
Weekend
Duration
# transactions
Price
Age
Tier

Upgrade decision
Airport
Phone reserve
Business
Weekend
Duration
# transactions
Price
Age
Tier

# check-out
Net supply

Upsell decision
Airport
Phone reserve
Business
Weekend
Duration
# transactions
Price
Age
Tier
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